Learned Predictiveness Models Predict Opposite Attention Biases in the Inverse Base-Rate Effect by Don, Hilary J. et al.
Running Head: ATTENTION BIASES IN THE INVERSE BASE-RATE EFFECT 
 
© 2019, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy 
of record and may not exactly replicate the final, authoritative version 
of the article. Please do not copy or cite without authors' permission. 










Hilary J. Don1 
Tom Beesley2 
Evan J. Livesey1 
 
 







Dr Hilary J. Don 
hilary.don@tamu.edu 
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, 
Texas A&M University  
4235 TAMU, College Station, TX 77840  
  
ATTENTION BIASES IN THE INVERSE BASE-RATE EFFECT 2 
Abstract 
Several attention-based models of associative learning are built upon the learned 
predictiveness principle, whereby learning is optimised by attending to the most 
predictive features and ignoring the least predictive features. Despite their functional 
similarity, these models differ in their formal mechanisms, and thus may produce very 
different predictions in some circumstances. As we demonstrate, this is particularly 
evident in the inverse base-rate effect. Using simulations with a modified Mackintosh 
model and the EXIT model, we found that models based on the learned predictiveness 
principle can account for rare-outcome choice biases associated with the inverse base-
rate effect, despite making opposite predictions for relative attention to rare versus 
common predictors. The models also make different predictions regarding changes in 
attention across training, and effects of context associations on attention to cues. 
Using a human causal learning task, we replicated the inverse base-rate effect and a 
recently reported reduction in this effect when the context is not predictive of the 
common outcome, and used eye-tracking to test model predictions about changes in 
attention both prior to making a decision, and during feedback. The results support the 
predictions made by EXIT, where the rare predictor commands greater attention than 
the common predictor throughout training. In addition, patterns of attention prior to 
making a decision differed to those during feedback, where effects of using a partially 
predictive context were evident only prior to making a prediction. 
 
Keywords: attention; inverse base-rate effect; eye tracking; Mackintosh; EXIT; 
context learning  
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There is a popular assumption among theorists of associative learning that processes 
of attention in learning operate based on the learned predictiveness principle (e.g., 
Kruschke, 1996; 2001b; Mackintosh, 1975; Lovejoy, 1968; Sutherland & Mackintosh, 
1971). This principle assumes that cues in our environment that reliably signal the 
occurrence of important or task-relevant outcomes increasingly capture attention as 
we learn about their predictive properties, and in turn become easier to learn about in 
the future because of the attention they command. Converging evidence from a range 
of psychological phenomena have confirmed this reciprocal relationship and 
highlighted its significance for cognitive psychology (see Le Pelley, Mitchell, 
Beesley, George, & Wills, 2016, for a review). This principle forms the basis for a 
class of attention-based models of associative learning. The most prominent of these 
models is the Mackintosh model (Mackintosh, 1975; hereafter simply referred to as 
Mackintosh).  
 Mackintosh offered a clear and persuasive explanation of the learned 
predictiveness principle as well as a formal description of the general operations by 
which learning processes may govern attention. These operations assume that 
attention increases to a cue that is a good predictor of the outcome relative to others 
presented at the same time, and attention decreases to poorer predictors. Both the 
general principle and specific operations outlined by Mackintosh have been critical in 
providing an explanation of related biases in learning, such as the learned 
predictiveness effect (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Lochman & Wills, 2003), 
many of which are broadly consistent with the model.  However, a recent review by 
Le Pelley et al. (2016) has brought into focus the fact that despite the considerable 
evidence consistent with the learned predictiveness principle, it is still not clear how 
learned changes in attention operate and, for instance, whether the processes 
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formalised by Mackintosh are indeed the most appropriate for capturing the effect. 
There is a need to assess the specific mechanisms offered by Mackintosh and other 
similar theories, especially in situations where they make diverging predictions. To 
this end, one phenomenon that may be particularly important for examining learned 
attention is the inverse base-rate effect (Medin & Edelson, 1988), a phenomenon that 
has conventionally been explained by learning models in which attentional biases are 
determined by associative prediction error, and yet has not been extensively used by 
associative learning theorists. Le Pelley et al. (2016) highlight the effect as potentially 
problematic for some attention models based on predictiveness principles, based on 
discrepancies in responses on single and compound cue trials. We will first introduce 
the inverse-base rate effect, and the predominant model of the effect, before returning 
to this issue in further detail.  
The inverse base-rate effect 
The inverse base-rate effect is a choice bias in human contingency learning. In 
the inverse base-rate effect, one frequently presented cue compound consistently 
predicts one outcome (e.g. AB-O1), while a less frequently presented cue compound 
predicts another outcome (e.g. AC-O2). Typically, AB-O1 and AC-O2 trials are 
presented in a 3:1 ratio such that cue B is relatively common compared to the rarer 
cue C and, likewise, the base-rate of O1 is high relative to O2. Cue A is therefore an 
imperfect predictor, as it is paired with both outcomes. Cue B (hereafter the common 
predictor) is a perfect predictor of the common outcome, O1 and cue C (hereafter the 
rare predictor) is a perfect predictor of the rare outcome, O2.1 After learning these 
contingencies, participants are given a test phase in which they are presented with the 
                                                        
1 Note that where there are multiple instantiations of the design, letters A–C will refer to all cues of the 
same type. That is, A refers to imperfect predictors, B to perfect predictors of common outcomes, and 
C to perfect predictors of rare outcomes.  
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individual cues, as well as several new combinations of cues, and asked to predict 
which outcome is most likely. When participants are shown the imperfect predictor 
(A) alone, participants tend to predict the common outcome, and to a lesser extent 
they show this same tendency on combined (ABC) trials. Although symptom A is 
associated with both outcomes, this response is consistent with the base-rates of the 
two outcomes. However when presented with the conflicting cue combination, BC, 
participants tend to predict the rare outcome, predicted by cue C.  In this case, both 
cues are equally predictive of their respective outcomes, such that the specific cues do 
not provide evidence in favour of one outcome over the other. However, O1 occurs 
much more frequently than O2, and thus an arguably rational response, considering 
the differing base-rates, would be to predict O1 (Shanks, 1992). The inverse base-rate 
effect therefore refers to this seemingly irrational choice of the rare outcome on 
conflicting trials, and appears to be robust under a variety of task scenarios and 
stimuli (Dennis & Kruschke, 1998; Johansen, Fouquet & Shanks, 2010; Kalish, 2001; 
Kalish & Kruschke, 2000; Kruschke, Kappenman & Hetrick, 2005; Lamberts & Kent, 
2007; Sherman et al., 2009).  
The inverse base-rate effect is typically explained by prioritised attention to 
cue C during training (Kruschke, 1996; 2001a). This account suggests that AB-O1 
trials are learned well and learned early, because they occur relatively frequently. As a 
result, both A and B become moderately associated with the common outcome, O1. 
The presence of A on the less frequent AC trials thus elicits an erroneous prediction 
of O1. To reduce subsequent error, and to preserve learning about AB trials, attention 
shifts away from the ambiguous cue A towards the more predictive cue, C. This 
attentional bias to C results in a stronger association between C and O2 than the 
association between B and O1. The change in attentional processing may also transfer 
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to BC trials, such that C is attended more than B and so cue C tends to control 
responding on BC trials at test. The idea that attention shifts away from A on AC 
trials is supported by the finding that a stronger association between A and the 
common outcome is necessary for rare outcome biases on BC trials (Shanks, 1992). 
The attention account of the inverse base-rate effect has been formalised in the 
EXIT model (Kruschke, 2001a; 2001b), which is a connectionist model of error-
driven attention and falls under the larger class of models based on the learned 
predictiveness principle. The EXIT model assumes that attention capacity is limited, 
and that attention is rapidly shifted towards cues that will reduce subsequent error. 
These attention distributions are then learned, and applied on subsequent trials 
according to their similarity to past exemplars. EXIT readily predicts the inverse base-
rate effect and related highlighting effects (Kruschke, 1996; 2005), and as such, 
explanations of the effect have typically relied on the specific mechanisms proposed 
in the EXIT model. Kruschke (2001b) described the EXIT model as a connectionist 
implementation of the theoretical principles proposed by Mackintosh, and noted that 
the models make the same predictions for changes in attention. It is thus often 
assumed that the EXIT model operates similarly to Mackintosh, despite there being 
important differences (discussed below) in how attention changes in the two models. 
To date, this assumption remains largely untested. As such, the primary aim of this 
study was to formally compare the predictions that the models make about attention 
change using our recent data on the inverse base-rate effect as a test bed (Don & 
Livesey, 2017), and to test those predictions using measures of overt attention during 
learning and at test. We will briefly discuss three related issues that motivated choices 
about experimental design and simulations in the current study before discussing the 
models and simulations in further detail.  
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Discrepancies between single-cue and compound trials. 
One previous study has raised questions about the ability of Mackintosh to 
account for some characteristics of the inverse base-rate effect.  In an EEG study, 
Wills, Lavric, Hemmings & Surrey (2014) measured ERP correlates of selective 
attention when cues were presented individually at test. They found that, despite 
greater correlates of selective attention on C alone trials than B alone trials, common 
outcome responses to cue B alone were greater than rare outcome responses to cue C 
alone. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only time this difference in responding 
to B and C test trials has been tested statistically, yet this trend is also seen in several 
other cases (e.g. Bohil, Markman, & Maddox, 2005; Kruschke, 1996; Medin & 
Edelson, 1988; Medin & Bettger, 1991; Shanks, 1992; Winman, Wennerholm, Juslin, 
& Shanks, 2005; see Winman, Wennerholm & Juslin, 2003, for further discussion of 
this issue).  
According to the Mackintosh model, this difference in accuracy for predictive 
cues implies greater associative strength for cue B than cue C, which should result in 
greater common outcome responses on conflicting BC trials. Yet, there were greater 
rare outcome responses on BC trials despite greater common responses on B trials 
than rare responses on C trials (Wills et al., 2014). This result is also problematic for a 
simple model of attention, in which the attention paid to a cue is directly related to its 
associative strength (Le Pelley et al., 2016). Nevertheless, Wills et al. (2014) suggest 
that some features of EXIT allow the model to account for the discrepancy between 
attention and responding to predictive cues. First, attention is normalised before 
influencing responding. That is, when cues are placed in direct competition (as in a 
compound trial), attention will influence the relative control of those cues over 
responding. However when a cue is presented individually, it has complete control 
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over responding, and attention will have little influence on responding. Thus 
responding on trials where B and C are presented individually may not be a good 
indication of the attention they receive when they are presented in compound. 
Attention in EXIT is also exemplar-mediated, such that the model can learn to direct 
attention away from A on AC trials, but maintain attention to A on AB trials. The 
similarity between AC and BC trials means that C should also receive prioritised 
attention on BC trials, which can account for an effect when associative strength for B 
may be higher than that for C (Kruschke, 2003; Wills et al., 2014).  
The role of context learning 
A potential way to reconcile the dissociation between attention and choice 
accuracy (e.g. Wills et al., 2014) with predictiveness principles is to assume a role of 
context learning. That is, the context may act as a cue that becomes associated with 
the outcomes, and subsequently influences responding on test trials. In an associative 
model, learning about the context is the primary mechanism for tracking overall base-
rates irrespective of the predictive cues that are presented. As a result of the 
differences in base-rates for the two outcomes, the context will come to be more 
strongly associated with the common outcome. Therefore on B alone trials, both the 
cue and the context would predict the occurrence of the common outcome, whereas 
on C alone trials, context associations will act to weaken rare outcome predictions, 
even if C-O2 associations are stronger than B-O1 associations.2 The effect of context 
                                                        
2 Models of associative learning like Mackintosh often make the simple assumption that outcome 
predictions are based on a simple linear summation of the associative strengths of cues present on a 
given trial. Given this assumption, it may be difficult for these models to simultaneously predict that a) 
B + context could result in a stronger prediction of O1 than C + context of O2, and b) that B + C + 
context could lead to stronger prediction of O2 than O1. However, these circumstances could be 
possible if an assumption of nonlinearity in the summation process at test is made, for example, 
assuming that the context contributes more when only a single cue is present (e.g. B alone) than when 
two cues are present (e.g. BC). Mackintosh does not have a built-in capacity for this type of 
nonlinearity, which means that it may be limited in what it can predict, but also means its predictions 
are less parameter specific. 
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associations on attention to cues in the inverse base-rate effect has yet to be 
investigated.  
In the EXIT model, context learning is captured by associations with a bias 
node, which may vary in salience. Initially EXIT was shown to predict higher 
accuracy for C alone trials than B alone trials in an overall fit of the data (Kruschke, 
2001a). Yet, when EXIT was refit to the data with heavy weighting of the difference 
in B and C trial responses, it was able to predict a rare bias on BC trials when 
accuracy for B exceeded that for C (Kruschke, 2003). Notably, the salience of the bias 
node in this reweighted fit was high (.938) in comparison to the initial fit, which 
suggests that EXIT can account for the dissociation between responses on single and 
compound cue trials when the context is salient.3  However, the inverse base-rate 
effect in this reweighted fit was reduced in magnitude compared to human choice, and 
the overall fit (indexed by root-mean-square error, RMSE) was poorer than in the 
initial, unweighted fit. We do not yet know whether the Mackintosh model can predict 
the inverse base-rate effect, or the dissociation in responding on single and compound 
cue trials.  
Global outcome frequency effects 
Assessing the influence of context associations in the inverse base-rate effect 
is difficult using the standard design alone, as the context will always be strongly 
associated with the frequently occurring outcome. However, we can assess the role of 
context by comparing the standard design to a “balanced” outcome design used in 
Don and Livesey (2017). This study compared the strength of the inverse base-rate 
effect with and without global outcome frequency differences. The design of the study 
                                                        
3 The value of .938 is based on a fit to the data from Experiment 1 in Kruschke (1996). Kruschke 
(2003) states the bias salience in the initial, unweighted fit was .010, yet the bias salience reported in 
Kruschke (2001a) for the data from Experiment 1 of Kruschke (1996) is actually .401. A bias salience 
value of .00 is instead reported for a fit to the data from Experiment 2 in Kruschke (2001a).  
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is shown in Table 1. In the standard condition, O1 was always paired with the 
common compounds AB and DE, and O2 was always paired with the rare compounds 
AC and DF. Similarly, O3 was always paired with the common compounds GH and 
JK, while O4 was always paired with the rare compounds GI and JL. Thus, O1 and 
O3 were experienced three times as often as O2 and O4. In the balanced condition, 
each outcome was paired with both a common compound and a rare compound, such 
that all outcomes were experienced with equal frequency over the course of the 
experiment. For example, O1 was paired with the common compound AB and the 
rare compound DF, while O2 was paired with the rare AC and the common DE. 
Similarly, O3 was paired with the common compound GH and the rare compound JL, 
while O4 was paired with the rare GI and common JK. In this way, the local base-rate 
difference within each overlapping set is maintained (e.g. O1 was the common 
outcome within overlapping AB and AC trials, and O2 was the common outcome 




Experimental Design Used in Experiment 2 of Don and Livesey (2017) 
Phase Group Trial type Base-
rate 
Trials 
Training Standard Common 3 AB – O1 DE – O1 GH – O3 JK – O3 
  Rare 1 AC – O2 DF – O2 GI – O4 JL – O4 
 Balanced Common 3 AB – O1 DE – O2 GH – O3 JK – O4 
  Rare 1 AC – O2 DF – O1 GI – O4 JL – O3 
Test  Imperfect 1 A D G J 
  Conflicting 1 BC EF HI KL 
  Combined 1 ABC DEF GHI JKL 
  Common predictor 1 B E H K 
  Rare predictor 1 C F I L 
  Trained common 1 AB DE GH JK 
  Trained rare 1 AC DF GI JL 
Note: The critical conflicting test trials are indicated in bold.  
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Using this design, Don and Livesey (2017) found that the inverse base-rate effect (i.e. 
preference for the rare outcome on BC trials at test) was substantially reduced when 
each outcome had been experienced at an equal rate across the experiment. It is 
important, in the first instance, to demonstrate that attention-based associative 
learning models can actually account for this difference, as it may indicate that other 
non-associative decision processes play a critical role in producing the inverse base-
rate effect. However, in principle, it should be possible for these models to do so by 
assuming that the associations between the context and the common outcome play a 
key role in enhancing the bias for the standard condition, where the outcome is 
globally common, but not in the balanced condition, where the outcome is only 
common for a given set of compounds. To test this idea, we first compare the 
predictions made by EXIT and Mackintosh in these designs, followed by an eye-
tracking study to examine potential differences in attention to cues in the standard and 
balanced conditions.  
 
Model simulations 
To examine the predictions made by the EXIT and Mackintosh models, we fit 
both models to the choice data from the outcome frequency design of Experiment 2 in 
Don & Livesey (2017), and extracted the relevant attention weights across training.  
EXIT and Mackintosh models 
EXIT. The EXIT model used in this simulation is described in detail in 
Kruschke (2001a). In brief, when a stimulus is presented, corresponding cue nodes are 
activated. Cue nodes become associated with outcome nodes as a consequence of 
learning guided by prediction error, and cue node activation activates outcome nodes 
in order to generate predictions based on this learning. As part of this process, the cue 
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node activation also goes through a process of attentional reweighting. First, cue node 
activation spreads to exemplar nodes, which are activated to the extent that the 
presented cue combination is similar to the cue combination represented by the 
exemplar node. Exemplar node activation then spreads to attention gain nodes that 
competitively normalise attention. If the exemplar has been encountered previously, 
the attention gain nodes are activated based on prior learned attention distributions for 
that particular exemplar. Once attention gain is normalised, the resulting distribution 
of attention is combined multiplicatively with the original cue activations. This 
modified activation then spreads to the outcome nodes, where the model makes an 
outcome prediction based on the relative activation of outcome nodes. The model then 
provides corrective feedback. Attention is rapidly shifted towards cues that will 
reduce subsequent prediction error, and this change in attention is applied before the 
associations between cues and outcomes are updated. This is an important feature of 
the model, since the associative weight between a cue and an outcome is adjusted 
proportionally to the attention that is paid to that cue. Therefore, by adjusting 
attention prior to any changes in associative strength, there is an immediate effect of 
error-driven attention shifting on learning. Associative weights between exemplar and 
gain nodes are also updated, so that the new distribution of attention is used when the 
stimulus is encountered in the future. Full details of the free parameters used in the 
EXIT model can be found in the Appendix.  
Mackintosh. The original version of the Mackintosh model—and the version 
that Wills et al. (2014) discuss critically in relation to the prediction it makes for 
single cues in the inverse base-rate effect—includes a separable error term for each 
cue. A separable error term limits the ability of the model to account for several 
learning phenomena, such as conditioned inhibition. Subsequent variations of 
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Mackintosh (e.g. Le Pelley, 2004; Suret & McLaren, 2005; Pearce & Mackintosh, 
2010) instead use a summed error term, which can better capture cue competition or 
interactions between the predictions of cues (as in the case of conditioned inhibition). 
A version of Mackintosh with a summed error term may better account for the 
apparent discrepancy between attention and associative strength, and was therefore 
used in the following model fits.4 Further details about this model can be found in the 
Appendix. In both the modified Mackintosh model and the EXIT model, attention to 
predictive cues should increase, and attention to non-predictive cues should decrease. 
Although both models operate on these similar theoretical principles, there are some 
important differences in the way each model operates. In Mackintosh, attention is 
synonymous with cue associability, such that the primary function of learned attention 
to a cue is to influence the rate of future learning about that cue. EXIT similarly 
assumes that more will be learned about attended cues. However in EXIT, attention 
influences output activation, such that cues with greater attention will have greater 
control over responding. Thus one clear difference is that in EXIT, the associative 
activation of the outputs can be influenced by the amount of attention cues receive. 
For instance, if cue A is associated with O1, the prediction of O1 can be enhanced 
when there is more attention to A and can be reduced when there is less attention to 
A. Mackintosh (1975) remained agnostic about the possibility of performance effects 
of this nature, but left these effects out of the model for the sake of simplicity. A 
second difference is that the learning of attention biases in EXIT is exemplar specific, 
such that attention to a particular cue may differ depending on the other cues with 
                                                        
4 Using the same methods for assessing the EXIT and modified Mackintosh model in the current study, 
we found that the original Mackintosh model with a separable error term provided a poor fit of the 
choice data (RMSE = 13.50), and did not predict an inverse base-rate effect. Rather, it predicted a 
strong bias in choice for the common outcome on conflicting trials in the standard group, and no bias in 
the balanced group.  Importantly, the original Mackintosh model made the same predictions for relative 
attention to cues as the modified Mackintosh model, described later in the paper. 
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which it is presented. For example, cue A may receive a different amount of attention 
when it is present on AB trials than when it is present on AC trials. In Mackintosh, 
alpha is stimulus-specific, rather than exemplar specific.  Further, EXIT makes 
specific predictions about the timing of attention shifting. Specifically, attention shifts 
immediately to the most predictive cue, as a response to error, and associative weights 
are updated after this shift has occurred, while Mackintosh assumes that changes in 
attention are applied on subsequent trials.  
Model fits were compared using two penalised-likelihood criteria; the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) and the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC; Schwarz, 1978). While RMSE indicates the degree to which the model fits the 
data, AIC and BIC deal with the trade-off between goodness of fit and model 
complexity (the number of parameters) by penalising models for additional free 
parameters. For the purposes of model comparison, the model with the lowest AIC or 
BIC is regarded as the best fitting model, and the difference (ΔAIC, ΔBIC) indicates 
how well the best model performs in comparison to the other model. AIC and BIC 
were calculated from the residual sum squares (RSS) with the following equations, 
where k is the number of free parameters, and n is the number of data points: 
 AIC =  2𝑘 + 𝑛ln(𝑅𝑆𝑆) (6) 
 BIC = 𝑛ln(𝑅𝑆𝑆/𝑛) + 𝑘ln(𝑛) (7) 
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Table 2 
Outcome choice percentages from the test phase of Experiment 2 of Don & Livesey 
(2017), with predictions from EXIT and Mackintosh. 
 Human  EXIT  Mackintosh 
Trial 
Standard Balanced  Standard Balanced  Standard Balanced 
C R C R  C R C R C R C R 
A 78.8 15.4 72.5 22.5  63.2 25.3 61.4 28.5  73.3 19.5 61.1 31.2 
BC 28.8 69.2 40.0 53.8  25.4 74.1 37.3 61.9  29.0 69.3 45.8 52.0 
ABC 42.3 57.1 64.4 33.8  40.2 59.4 57.5 42.2  43.5 56.3 63.1 36.7 
Novel 65.4 26.9 58.1 30.0  62.1 25.3 60.4 28.4  73.3 19.5 61.1 31.2 
B 94.2 1.3 96.3 1.3  87.2 4.4 91.8 2.7  99.6 0.0 99.5 0.0 
C 3.8 93.6 6.3 83.8  1.1 96.7 2.0 93.7  0.0 99.5 0.0 99.5 
AB 100 0.0 98.8 1.3  97.8 0.8 98.9 0.4  100 0.0 100 0.0 
AC 5.1 92.9 8.1 90.0  0.4 99.1 1.1 97.6  0.0 99.9 0.0 99.9 
Note: these data are presented in the percentage of outcome choice out of all possible 
outcome choices. C refers to common outcome responses, R refers to rare outcome 
responses. Trials of primary interest are presented in bold. Choice proportions do not 
necessarily sum to 100, as participants had a choice of four outcomes during the test 
phase, of which only two were the relevant common or relevant rare outcome.  
 
Typically, ΔAIC of 0-2 indicates little difference between models, 4-7 indicates 
considerably less support for the model with larger AIC, and >10 indicates a great 
deal of support for the model with lower AIC (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).  
 
Choice fits 
Table 2 shows the choice data from Don & Livesey (2017, Experiment 2), and 
the predictions from EXIT and Mackintosh for each trial type. Both models provided 
a reasonable fit of the group differences, although overall, Mackintosh provided a 
considerably better fit of the data than EXIT (ΔAIC = 5.47; ΔBIC = 7.01). Both 
models were able to predict a reduction in the rare bias on conflicting trials in the 
balanced group compared to the standard group, as well as the accompanying 
decrease in the common bias on imperfect trials in the balanced group. However, the 
models differ in their predictions for individual predictive cue trials. The experimental 
data shows numerically greater accuracy for cue B alone than cue C alone. Although 
there were no significant group effects, this appears to be primarily driven by the 
balanced group. This might indicate that the reduced inverse base-rate effect in the 
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balanced group is due to better learning about the common predictor. Neither model 
predicts this result when using the parameters that provide the best overall fit. EXIT 
predicts greater rare choices for cue C alone than common choices for cue B alone in 
both groups, although this is somewhat weaker in the balanced group. In comparison, 
Mackintosh predicts that rare choices for C are equal to common choices for B in both 
groups.  
Attention weights 
After fitting the choice data, attention weights (α) for predictive cues, 
imperfect cues, and the context across training were extracted from the models. 
Figure 1 shows attention weights predicted by EXIT at two different stages, pre-shift 
attention (panel A and B; see equation 5 in Kruschke, 2001a) and post-shift attention 
(panel C and D), as well as the difference in post- and pre-shift attention (panel E and 
F).  
In EXIT, post-shift attention indicates the amount of attention to cues after 
making an outcome prediction, at the point just prior to updating learning weights. 
These attention weights following feedback indicate which cues the model finds to be 
most useful in reducing error. It is worth noting that in this fit, the post-shift attention 
weights reach their asymptote very quickly, with little or no change after the second 
block of training. However, only some of this post-shift attention distribution is 
learned by the model and carried forward into the next trial, represented by pre-shift 
attention weights in panels A and B. This learned attention indicates the attention paid 
to cues prior to making a decision, and changes more gradually across training as it 
increments closer to the post-shift weights. This learned attention is represented by 
the pre-shift attention is panels A and B, which changes more gradually across 
training as it increments closer to the post-shift weights.     
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In both groups, post-shift attention (panel C and D) to predictive cues (B or C) 
is higher than the imperfect cue (A) on both common and rare trials. This difference 
in attention is much larger on rare trials than common trials, and this pattern did not 
differ substantially between the standard and balanced groups. Post-shift attention to 
the context did differ between groups, however. In the standard group, there was 
greater attention to the context on common trials than rare trials, consistent with the 
notion that the context was a more predictive cue on these trials. In contrast, the 
balanced group showed weaker post-shift attention to the context on common trials 
and stronger attention on rare trials. 
Pre-shift attention (panel A and B) to predictive cues remained high 
throughout training in both groups, but there were differences in pre-shift attention to 
the imperfect cues between groups. In the standard group, there was a greater 
decrease in attention to the imperfect predictor on rare trials than common trials. In 
the balanced group, this difference in attention to the imperfect predictor on common 
and rare trials was comparatively reduced. Consequently, this might result in 
relatively stronger associative strength for the common predictor and weaker 
associative strength for the rare predictor in the balanced group compared to the 
standard group. Interestingly, the post-shift attention to the context does not appear to 
be learned, which may be due to the low bias salience in the best-fitting parameters.  
Because not all post-shift attention is learned and carried forward to pre-shift 
attention on the next trial, we also plotted the difference between post-shift attention 
and pre-shift attention at each point in training (Panels E and F). This indicates the 
amount of change in attention to cues within a trial. Positive scores indicate a shift 
towards the cue, while negative scores indicate a shift away from the cue. The 
difference scores indicate that early in training, there are large shifts in attention away 
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from the imperfect predictor on rare trials, which then decrease across training as this 
attention distribution is learned. 
 
 
Figure 1. Pre-shift and post-shift attention for predictive cues, imperfect cues and 
context in Experiment 2 as predicted by EXIT. 
 
 






















































































a) Pre-shift attention: Standard group b) Pre-shift attention: Balanced group
c) Post-shift attention: Standard group d) Post-shift attention: Balanced group
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Figure 2. Alphas for predictive and imperfect cues in Experiment 2 as predicted by 
Mackintosh   
 
Attention weights from the Mackintosh model are shown in Figure 2. Across 
training, α for predictive cues increased while α for the imperfect cues decreased. 
Overall, α for the predictive cue was higher on common trials than on rare trials. Due 
to the base-rates, B gains a higher α than the rare predictor early in training, while α 
for C gradually catches up across training. A modified Mackintosh model that 
contains a summed prediction error term can still predict an inverse base-rate effect 
on conflicting trials when α for B is greater than α for C, as there would be greater 
competition from A on common trials than rare trials. Although A is an imperfect 
predictor, it is a better predictor of the common outcome than the rare outcome, so it 
will compete effectively with B, but less so with C, such that C will gain a relatively 
large proportion of the associative strength with the rare outcome. In the balanced 
group, α is higher for B and lower for C compared to the standard group. Therefore 
Mackintosh appears to account for the difference between groups via greater 
overshadowing by A on rare trials, and weaker overshadowing by A on common 
trials.  
Comparing predictions from EXIT and Mackintosh 
























a) Standard group b) Balanced group
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Overall, the Mackintosh model provided a better fit of the choice data than 
EXIT, although the pattern of choice results was similar between models. Most 
interestingly, the predicted pattern of attention to cues during training varied 
substantially between the two models. The clearest and most critical difference is the 
predictions for relative attention paid to the predictive cues. The EXIT model 
predicted greater attention to cue C on rare AC trials than to cue B on common AB 
trials, whereas Mackintosh predicted greater attention to B on AB trials than to C on 
AC trials, at all points during training. These predictions are based on the optimal fit 
of parameters. However, it is important to consider whether these are general 
predictions from these models. This is particularly important because EXIT’s 
operations are complex and nonlinear and other quite different combinations of 
parameters can satisfactorily predict an inverse base-rate effect (e.g. Kruschke, 
2001a). We therefore ran 1000 simulations of each model with random parameters 
(within the constraints specified in the Appendix). For the EXIT model, 93.3% of 
simulations predicted a greater bias in attention to C on AC trials than B on AB trials 
in pre-shift attention, and 95.1% of parameters predicted this pattern in post-shift 
attention. For Mackintosh, 99.4% of random parameters predicted greater attention 
biases to B on AB trials than to C on AC trials. These differing ordinal predictions of 
attention to cues therefore appear to be parameter general. Mackintosh was also far 
less likely to predict an inverse base-rate effect on conflicting trials, producing the 
effect on only 9% of simulations, while EXIT produced the effect on 77% of 
simulations.5   
                                                        
5 The original Mackintosh model with a separable error term predicted the same bias in relative 
attention as the modified Mackintosh model. Of 1000 simulations with random parameters, 86% 
predicted a greater bias to B on AB trials than to C on AC trials. None of these combinations of 
random parameters predicted an inverse base-rate effect.  
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The second difference is in changes in attention across training. Both models 
predict an increasing attention bias between predictive and non-predictive cues, 
however the influence of exemplar versus stimulus specific attention is clear. In 
EXIT, attention allocation to a specific cue is allowed to vary depending on the 
exemplar in which it is present. The trial base-rates affect attention biases because 
encountering a greater number of common AB trials results in a stronger prediction 
error on rare AC trials, thus leading to a stronger shift in attention towards the 
predictive cue on AC trials specifically. The attention bias developing across trials 
therefore manifests in EXIT as a compound-specific reduction in attention to A, 
which is stronger on AC trials than on AB trials. In Mackintosh, attention is stimulus 
specific, such that attention allocation to the imperfect cue on AC trials will be 
influenced by the attention it receives on AB trials, and vice versa. On both trial 
types, A is a poorer predictor, and therefore attention shifts towards the perfect 
predictor. Because there are three times as many AB trials than AC trials, this 
increase in attention to the perfect predictor will occur more frequently for AB trials 
than AC trials. The bias predicted by Mackintosh therefore manifests as a faster 
increase in attention for B than for C.   
Finally, the two models also account for differences between standard and 
balanced groups in different ways. In EXIT, the bias for C over B was greater in the 
standard group than in the balanced group, while in Mackintosh, there was weaker 
attention to C in the balanced group than the standard group, although this difference 
is only subtle. EXIT also predicted differences in attention to the context between the 
standard and balanced groups. In the standard group, there was greater attention to the 
context on common trials than rare trials, which is a consequence of the context being 
a more useful predictor on common trials. This bias to context on common trials was 
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much weaker in the balanced group than the standard group, suggesting a less critical 
role of context when outcomes are experienced in equal frequency.  
 
Testing model predictions with overt measures of attention 
EXIT and Mackintosh make different ordinal predictions about relative 
attention to cues, how those attention biases change across training, and how attention 
biases differ based on global outcome frequency. We used eye-tracking to test these 
differing predictions. Eye gaze is often used as a measure of overt attention in 
learning (Beesley, Hanafi, Vadillo, Shanks, & Livesey, 2018; Beesley, Nguyen, 
Pearson & Le Pelley, 2015; Easdale, Le Pelley & Beesley, 2018; Le Pelley, Beesley 
& Griffiths, 2014; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005; Thorwart, Livesey, Wilhelm, Liu & 
Lachnit, 2017, Wills, Lavric, Croft & Hodgson, 2007). While it is possible to make 
covert shifts of attention without accompanying eye movements, attention and gaze 
are generally closely related (Posner, 1980). Although neither model specifies the way 
in which attention will translate to overall eye gaze, the models at least make different 
ordinal predictions in terms of which cues should experience greater attention. We 
assume that measures of fixation time will provide an indication of how attention is 
allocated to cues and how that allocation changes throughout training.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study reporting measures of 
overt attention in the inverse base-rate effect, although researchers have used eye-
tracking to study the related highlighting effect, where AB trials are trained prior to 
the introduction of AC trials (Kruschke, Kappenman & Hetrick, 2005). They found 
greater fixation time for cue C on BC test trials, and a greater bias in fixation time to 
the predictive cue on AC trials than AB trials at test. It might be tempting to assume 
that this provides clear evidence in favour of EXIT’s predictions for attention. Yet, 
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differences in attention to cues across training were not reported, and again, it is 
unknown whether base-rate differences when all trials are experienced at each stage 
of training will result in the same differences in attention as when cues are trained in a 
staged manner as in highlighting. It is also unclear whether choice on BC trials is a 
result of prioritised attention to C, leading to greater control by cue C, or whether it is 
due to greater learning about the C-O2 association during training. This could be 
important for isolating the locus of the inverse base-rate effect and the cause of 
accuracy differences for individual (B and C) cue trials.  
There are currently inconsistent results regarding which cue is processed to a 
greater extent on BC trials at test. Wills et al. (2014) found greater ERP correlates of 
selective attention for C than for B when they were presented individually at test. In a 
recent fMRI study O'Bryan, Worthy, Livesey, & Davis (2018) used multivoxel 
pattern analysis to determine the extent to which participants were activating 
information involved in the representation of common and rare predictors. Faces, 
objects and scenes were used as cues, as these categories have well-defined regions of 
representation in the cortex. For example, imperfect predictors were always faces, but 
common and rare predictors were either objects or scenes, balanced within subjects. 
Prior to training, regions of sensitivity to these categories were determined for each 
participant, which were then compared to patterns of activation on conflicting test 
trials. This technique provides an index of neural similarity, which reflects the 
strength of representation of specific features, and is assumed to index a combination 
of feature-based attention and memory retrieval for what has been learned about those 
features. O'Bryan et al. found neural activity indicative of greater representation of 
cue B than cue C on conflicting trials when participants chose the rare outcome. 
These neural measures of stimulus processing are quite different from one another in 
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their time course and founding assumptions, and also distinctly different from 
measures of overt attention typically used in learning. Nevertheless they are certainly 
sufficient to warrant examining fixation time to cues at test, broken down according 
to outcome choice.  
The EXIT model in particular makes clear predictions about attention shifts 
after an outcome choice, when the correct outcome is revealed. That is, attention is 
driven towards the cue that is most likely to reduce future error before the end of the 
trial. Part of this attention shift is learned, such that a proportion of the new attention 
distribution is applied when a similar stimulus is encountered. Due to this distinction, 
measures of fixation time were divided into two time periods; fixation time from the 
onset of cues until a response is made, which should reflect the learned pre-shift 
attention to cues in Figure 1 (panels A and B), and fixation time after making a 
response, during corrective feedback, which should reflect post-shift attention 
illustrated in Figure 1. It is possible that overt gaze at this stage of the trial will reflect 
the end-state of attention (as in panels C and D), or the amount of updating of 
attention biases required between pre-shift attention and end-state attention, indicated 
by the change in attention from pre-shift to post-shift attention (as in panels E & F).  
In this experiment, participants completed either the standard or balanced 
version of base-rate training, followed by the typical inverse base-rate effect transfer 
test trials (see Table 3). Note that in this experiment, we used only two outcomes, 
rather than the four outcomes that were used in Don & Livesey (2017). The 
contingencies were presented using an allergist task, which has been used frequently 
in human contingency learning studies (e.g., Larkin, Aitken & Dickinson, 1998; Le 
Pelley & McLaren, 2001; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994; Waldmann & Holyoak, 
1992) and has proven useful for studying attention transfer in the learned 
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predictiveness effect (Don & Livesey, 2015; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Shone, 
Harris & Livesey, 2015). EXIT predicts greater pre-decision attention to cue C on AC 
trials than to cue B on AB trials. This bias should be greater in the standard group 
than in the balanced group, and should increase over training. During feedback, there 
should also be a stronger bias in gaze towards the predictive cue on rare trials than 
common trials, which does not differ between groups. If attention during feedback 
reflects end-state attention, this gaze bias should be acquired early and remain 
consistent throughout training, but if it reflects the change from pre- to post-shift 
attention, the gaze bias should decrease across training. Mackintosh instead predicts 
greater attention to cue B on AB trials than to cue C on AC trials, and that this 
difference between the two predictors decreases across training. Mackintosh does not 
make specific predictions about attention biases during the feedback period of the 
trial, though one might assume that post-feedback eye gaze could reflect the updating 
of attention that occurs post-learning. If this were the case then one would expect 
stronger attention biases towards B early in training, and stronger attention towards C 
later in training, as alpha for B reaches ceiling faster than alpha for C, and prediction 




Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Human Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Sydney. Sixty-four undergraduate students from the 
University of Sydney participated in return for partial course credit (51 female, mean 
age = 19.6 years, SD = 4.21). Participants were randomly allocated to standard and 
balanced conditions (n = 32). Because there was no precedent for the expected effect 
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size in attention, we chose a sample size that was greater than that used in other 
studies examining eye-gaze in learning (e.g., Easdale, Le Pelley & Beesley, 2018; Le 
Pelley, Beesley & Griffiths, 2011). We continued collecting data until we reached 32 
participants per group.  
Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was programmed using PsychToolbox for Matlab (Kleiner, 
Brainard & Pelli, 2007). Participants were tested individually, and eye gaze was 
measured using a 23-inch Tobii TX300 Eye Tracker, which has a sample rate of 300 
Hz. Participants were seated approximately 55cm from the monitor, with a chin rest to 
maintain a fixed position. The eye tracker was calibrated using a five-point procedure 
at the beginning of the experiment. Cue stimuli were 300 x 300 pixel images of 
Coffee, Fish, Lemon, Cheese, Eggs, Garlic, Bread, Peanuts, Avocado, Banana, 
Bacon, Peas, Apple, Mushrooms, Strawberries, Broccoli, Cherries, Butter, Olive Oil, 
Chocolate, Carrots, Peach, Milk, and Prawns, randomly allocated to cues A-L. These 
were presented horizontally aligned on the upper half of the screen. The two outcome 
stimuli were randomly allocated from the allergic reactions Headache, Nausea, Rash 
and Fever, presented in text boxes on the lower half of the screen, vertically aligned 
with the center of the two cues. Stimuli were presented following a 500ms 
presentation of a fixation cross at the horizontal centre of the screen. The distance 
between the centre of the cross and the centre of each cue was 15cm. Outcome 
options appeared 500ms after the presentation of the cues. Responses were made 
using a standard mouse and keyboard. Feedback was provided for two seconds in the 
centre of the screen. 
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Table 3 
Experimental Design for the Current Study 
Phase Group Trial type Base-
rate 
Trials 
Training Standard Common 3 AB – O1 DE – O1 GH – O1 JK – O1 
  Rare 1 AC – O2 DF – O2 GI – O2 JL – O2 
 Balanced Common 3 AB – O1 DE – O2 GH – O1 JK – O2 
  Rare 1 AC – O2 DF – O1 GI – O2 JL – O1 
Test  Imperfect 1 A D G J 
  Conflicting 1 BC EF HI KL 
  Combined 1 ABC DEF GHI JKL 
  Common predictor 1 B E H K 
  Rare predictor 1 C F I L 
  Trained common 1 AB DE GH JK 
  Trained rare 1 AC DF GI JL 
Note: The critical conflicting test trials are indicated in bold.  
 
Procedure 
Participants assumed the role of a doctor whose task was to determine which 
foods were causing which allergic reaction in their patient, Mr X. On each trial during 
training, two food cues appeared, and participants were asked to predict which 
allergic reaction would occur after Mr X had eaten that meal by clicking on one of 
two outcome options on the lower half of the screen. Once an outcome was selected, 
the options disappeared and corrective feedback was provided. Participants were told 
that at first they would have to guess, but using the feedback provided, their accuracy 
should improve over time. The arrangement of the two cues on the screen was 
counterbalanced within each block and the positions of the two outcomes were 
randomised for each participant but held constant throughout the session. There were 
seven blocks of training including the contingencies presented in Table 3, in a 3:1 
base-rate. Each block contained six presentations of the frequent trial types and two 
presentations of the infrequent trial types, such that there were 224 training trials.  
The test phase began immediately following training. Participants were 
instructed to use the knowledge that they had gained so far to predict the allergic 
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reaction that was most likely to occur after Mr X ate meals containing one, two, or 
three foods. In this phase, food cues appeared on the upper half of the screen and 
participants made their prediction by clicking on an outcome, which then turned blue. 
Once a choice was made, a continuous rating scale ranging from “not at all confident” 
to “very confident” appeared beneath the options, and participants were asked to rate 
their confidence that they had made the correct choice. Responding was self-paced, 
and participants were able to modify their response before moving to the next trial. 
The test phase included one repetition of each of the transfer trials in Table 3, 
presented in random order. The arrangement of the two cues on the screen was 
randomised for each trial, and outcome options were presented in the same 
arrangement as in training.  
Eye gaze analysis 
Fixation time on each trial was separated into two time periods – a “pre-
decision” period which spanned stimulus onset to a response, and a “feedback” 
period, which began once a prediction had been made, and continued while the 
feedback was presented on screen until the end of the trial. On each trial, the 
percentage of missing samples was calculated, and the data from the eye with the least 
missing samples were used. Gaps of missing data less than 75 milliseconds were 
interpolated between the data preceding and following the gap. Fixations were 
determined by a displacement method (Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000). The horizontal 
and vertical coordinates of gaze data were analysed in 150ms windows, and a fixation 
was determined if the coordinates did not deviate beyond a range of 75 pixels. This 
window was then extended until a deviation of greater than 75 pixels was recorded, to 
determine fixation length. Fixation position was taken as the mean horizontal and 
vertical pixel coordinates across the fixation sample. Any fixation recorded within a 
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500 x 500 pixel region of interest (ROI) centered on the cue image (providing a 100 
pixel ROI surrounding the cue image) was taken as a fixation on that cue.. 
Trials without any recorded fixations were removed from the analyses, and 
participants with more than 30% missing trials in either the decision or feedback 
period in the training, or during the test phase, were excluded from the respective eye 
gaze analysis (their data were used in the behavioural analyses). This resulted in the 
exclusion of one participant from the training phase gaze analysis, and two 
participants from the test phase analysis. For the remaining participants, mean 
excluded trials were 3.7%, (SE = 0.8) during training, and 0.8% (SE = 0.4) during the 
test phase. To control for potential differences in response time between trial types, 
fixation time was analysed as a proportion of response time in the pre-decision period 
in training, and as a proportion of the time taken to first select an outcome during the 
test phase. Fixations while rating confidence, or altering outcome choice during the 






Training accuracy. To analyse the training accuracy data shown in Figure 
3A, a 2 x (2) x (7) mixed measures ANOVA was run with group (standard vs. 
balanced) as a between subjects factor, and trial type (common vs. rare) and block (1 
– 7) as within subjects factors. There was a significant linear effect of block, F(1,62) 
= 303.76, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .83, and quadratic effect of block, F(1,62) = 166.82, p < .001,  
𝜂𝑝
2  = .729. There was a significant main effect of trial type, with greater accuracy for 
common trials overall, F(1,62) = 134.57, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .685, and group, with greater 
accuracy in the standard group overall, F(1,62) = 7.33, p = .009, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .106. There was 
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a significant interaction between group and trial type, such that there was a greater 
difference in accuracy for common and rare trials for the balanced group, F(1,62) = 
10.59, p = .002, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .146. There were also significant interactions between the linear 
effect of block and trial type, F(1,62) = 73.29, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .542, and between the 
quadratic effect of block and trial type, F(1,62) = 24.74, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .285, 
indicating common trials were learned about faster than rare trials. There were also 
interactions between the linear effect of block and group, F(1,62) = 10.25, p = .002, 
𝜂𝑝
2  = .142, and a significant three-way interaction between the linear effect of block, 
group, and trial type, where there was a greater difference in the speed of learning for 
common and rare trials for the balanced group than the standard group, F(1,62) = 
7.07, p = .01, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .102.  
Test. Responses for all trial types are shown in Table 4, and the proportion of 
relevant rare outcome choices for the three critical transfer trials is shown in Figure 
3B. Although the combined trials are included here for consistency with previous 
research, we do not place too much weight on them, as response biases on combined 
trials are generally much less reliable than those seen on imperfect and conflicting 
trials (see Shanks, 1992). Where a null effect is of potential theoretical importance, 
we include Bayes Factor (BF) to assess the evidence in favour of the null, based on 
Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey & Iverson’s (2009) JZS prior with scaling factor r = 
.707. 
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Figure 3. Choice data including A) Response accuracy during training for common 
and rare trial types in each group, and B) Proportion rare choice on imperfect, 
conflicting and combined transfer trials during the test phase. Error bars indicate 
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Table 4. 
Choice responses and confidence ratings for all test trials  
  Choice  
Transfer Trial Group Common Rare Confidence 
Imperfect Standard .836 .164 52.89 
A, D, G, J Balanced .648 .352 57.41 
 
Conflicting Standard .281 .719 60.20 
BC, EF, HI, KL Balanced .445 .555 51.75 
 
Combined Standard .227 .773 68.48 
ABC, DEF, GHI, JKL Balanced .703 .297 65.12 
 
Common predictor Standard .953 .047 76.76 
B, E, H, K Balanced .961 .039 79.22 
 
Rare predictor Standard .039 .961 78.36 
C, F, I, L Balanced .094 .906 75.23 
 
Trained Common Standard .984 .016 94.61 
AB, DE, GH, JK Balanced .984 .016 94.87 
 
Trained Rare Standard .023 .977 94.28 
 AC, DF, GI, JL Balanced .070 .930 88.03 
Note: as there are only two outcomes in this experiment, choice proportions sum to 1. 
 
The proportion of rare choice on these trials replicates the pattern of results reported 
in Don and Livesey (2017; Experiment 2) fairly closely. There was a significant 
inverse base-rate effect in the standard group with a greater proportion of rare 
outcome choices on conflicting (BC) trials, t(31) = 4.39, p < .001, d  = 0.78. While 
there was a small numerical bias for choosing the rare outcome on conflicting trials in 
the balanced group, this did not reach significance, t(31) = 1.27, p = .214, d = 0.22 
The rare-bias was significantly weaker on conflicting trials in the balanced than the 
standard group, t(62) = 2.49, p = .016, d = 0.62. On imperfect (A) trials, responding 
was significantly common-biased in both groups, lowest t(31) = 4.01, p < .001, d = 
0.71, but this was significantly weaker in the balanced than standard group, t(62) = 
3.31, p = .002, d = 0.83. On combined (ABC) trials, choice was significantly rare-
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biased in the standard group, t(31) = 7.96, p < .001, d = 1.41, and significantly 
common-biased in the balanced group, t(31) = 4.94, p < .001, d = 0.87, and there was 
a significant difference in choices between the two groups, t(62) = 8.89, p < .001, d = 
2.22. Overall, there was no significant difference in accuracy for common (mean = 
.96, SD = .12) and rare predictors (mean correct responses = .93, SD = .16), F(1,62) = 
1.32, p = .255, 𝜂𝑝
2  =.021, BF01 = 3.95. There was also no main effect or interaction 
with group, highest F(1,62) = 2.35, p = .131, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .036. 
Eye gaze 
Pre-decision. Pre-decision fixation time on each cue, as a proportion of total 
decision time is shown in Figure 4. We ran a 2 x (2) x (2) x (7) repeated measures 
ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor, and cue predictiveness (imperfect 
vs. perfect), trial type (common vs. rare) and block (1-7) as within-subjects factors. 
There were significantly longer fixations on predictive cues than imperfect cues 
overall, F(1,61) = 21.97, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .265. Fixation time was also generally higher 
on rare trials than on common trials, F(1,61) = 12.18, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .166, but a 
significant interaction with linear trend in block revealed that this difference 
decreased over training, F(1,61) = 14.94, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .197. Critically, there was a 
significant predictiveness x trial type interaction F(1,61) = 12.50, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .17, 
with a greater bias for perfect predictors on rare trials than on common trials. This 
result is clearly consistent with the predictions of EXIT and not Mackintosh. There 
was also a significant three-way interaction between predictiveness, trial type and 
group, F(1,61) = 8.02, p = .006, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .12. Further analysis for each group separately 
showed that in the standard group, there was a significant interaction between 
predictiveness and trial type, F(1,30) = 22.09, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .424, where there was a 
significant bias towards the predictive cue on rare trials, F(1,30) = 21.93, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  
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= .422, but not on common trials, F < 1, BF01 = 5.21. In contrast, in the balanced 
group, the bias towards the predictive cue did not differ between common and rare 
trials, F < 1, BF01 = 4.67, and the predictive cue bias was significant for both trial 
types, lowest F(1,30) = 5.88, p = .021, 𝜂𝑝
2  =.159. The bias for rare predictors on rare 
trials did not differ between standard and balanced groups F(1,59) = 1.71, p = .196, 
𝜂𝑝
2  = .027, BF01 = 1.90. 
 
 
 Figure 4. Fixation time as a proportion of response time (RT) during the pre-decision 
period for A) common trials in the standard group, B) rare trials in the standard group, 
C) common trials in the balanced group, and D) rare trials in the balanced group. 
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.   
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a) Standard common trials (AB) b) Standard rare trials (AC) 
c) Balanced common trials (AB) d) Balanced rare trials (AC)
ATTENTION BIASES IN THE INVERSE BASE-RATE EFFECT 35 
To determine whether biases in attention changed over the course of training, 
we examined linear effects of block. This revealed a significant interaction between 
block, predictiveness and trial type, F(1,61) = 5.98, p = .017, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .089. To further 
investigate this interaction, common and rare trials were analysed separately. The bias 
for predictive cues relative to imperfect predictors significantly increased across 
training on rare trials, F(1,61) = 11.20, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .155, but there was no 
significant change on common trials, F(1,61) = 3.49, p = .067, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .054. These 
effects did not interact with group, Fs < 1.  
 
 
Figure 5. Fixation time as a proportion of feedback time for a) common trials in the 
standard group, b) rare trials in the standard group, c) common trials in the balanced 
group, and d) rare trials in the balanced group. Error bars indicate standard error of 
the mean 






























































































































a) Standard common trials (AB) b) Standard rare trials (AC)
c) Balanced common trials (AB) d) Balanced rare trials (AC)
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Feedback. Fixation time during feedback, shown in Figure 5, was analysed as 
a proportion of the fixed feedback time of two seconds. There were again 
significantly longer fixations on predictive cues than imperfect cues, F(1,61) = 28.32, 
p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .317. There was also greater fixation time on rare trials than common 
trials overall, F(1,61) = 44.65, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .423, which decreased over training, 
F(1,61) = 8.15, p = .006, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  .118. There was a significant interaction between trial 
type and cue type, F(1,61) = 20.30, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .250, such that there was a greater 
difference in fixation time to predictive and imperfect cues on rare trials than on 
common trials. This effect of cue predictiveness was only significant on rare trials, 
F(1,61) = 31.02, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .337, and not on common trials, F(1,61) = 3.29, p = 
.075, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .051, BF01 = 1.52.  
Unlike fixations during the decision period, the interaction between cue 
predictiveness and trial type did not further interact with group, F < 1. There was a 
significant three-way interaction between the linear trend of block, predictiveness and 
trial type, F(1,61) = 4.56, p = .037, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .07. This indicates that the bias towards the 
predictive cue decreased across training for rare trials, F(1,61) = 4.22, p = .044, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 
.065, but not for common trials, F < 1. There was no significant interaction with 
group for either trial type, highest F(1,61) = 2.31, p = .134, 𝜂𝑝
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Figure 6. Gaze to common and rare predictors according to outcome choice on 
conflicting trials during the test phase.  
 
Test. On conflicting test trials, there was no difference in fixation time to 
common or rare predictors, F < 1, BF01 = 4.74, and no effects of group, Fs < 1, lowest 
BF01 = 3.50. There was also no difference in attention to common and rare cues when 
considering only the trials on which a rare outcome was chosen, F < 1, BF01 = 7.09 
(see Figure 6; cf. O'Bryan et al., 2017), and no main effect or interaction with group, 
highest F(1,43) = 1.94, p = .171, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  0.043, BF01 = 1.72. 
 
Discussion  
This study tested the conflicting predictions of EXIT and Mackintosh about 
attention to cues in the inverse base-rate effect, and the influence of context 
associations on attention to cues. Overall, the results provided greater relative 
evidence for the predictions of EXIT over Mackintosh. The experiment also 
replicated an effect of global outcome frequency on the inverse base-rate effect. The 
bias towards choosing the rare outcome on conflicting trials was significantly weaker 
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in the balanced group where the outcome occurred at an equal rate across the entire 
experiment, suggesting an influence of context associations on choice biases.  
Overall, there was a greater fixation bias to cue C on rare trials than to cue B 
on common trials, and this effect differed between the two training procedures. In the 
standard group, both cues were attended equally on AB trials, but there was greater 
attention to C on AC trials. In the balanced group, more time was spent attending to 
predictive cues B or C than to A regardless of the trial type. During the test phase, 
there were no differences in fixation time to common and rare cues on conflicting 
trials, even when only considering trials where the rare outcome was chosen. This 
pattern also did not differ between groups.  
Previous studies have shown that choice accuracy for B is greater than choice 
accuracy for C at test, in the presence of an inverse base-rate effect (e.g. Wills et al., 
2014). In this experiment, there was no benefit in accuracy for B over C when tested 
individually, and this did not differ between standard and balanced groups. However, 
responding on these trials was close to ceiling and therefore a reliable difference in 
performance on these trials may be difficult to detect. The following discussion will 
compare the results with model predictions.  
Relative attention to cues 
  The EXIT model predicted a greater bias in attention to C on AC trials than to 
B on AB trials, whereas Mackintosh predicted the opposite pattern, with higher 
attention to B on AB trials than to C on AC trials. Measures of fixation time indicated 
a greater bias for C over A than for B over A, both prior to making an outcome choice 
(in the standard group only), and during feedback (in both groups). These results 
indicate a clear attention advantage for C over B, and are more consistent with the 
predictions from EXIT.  
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Changes in attention over training 
There were differences in the change in attention biases throughout training 
between the decision period and the feedback period. During the decision period, eye-
gaze biases towards C on rare AC trials became more pronounced over training, and 
there was no significant change in biases on common trials. This pattern of attention 
is mostly consistent with the pattern of pre-shift attention biases predicted by EXIT, 
and likely reflects the current state of learning about cues. That is, attention prior to 
choice is an exploitative process, in which attention is directed towards cues that will 
be most useful in producing a correct outcome prediction.   
During feedback, preferential attention to C on AC trials was stronger earlier 
in training than later in training. This change in attention appears to follow the 
reduction in prediction error, which was higher early in training, and lower later in 
training. Thus, attention during feedback appears to be a response to error, directed 
towards the cues most likely to reduce future prediction error.  
Interestingly, the reduction in this bias for the rare predictor during feedback is 
also broadly consistent with a metric we derived from EXIT; the amount of attention 
change from pre-shift attention to post-shift attention, which also declines over 
training (Figure 1, Panels E and F). Thus attention during feedback may reflect an 
updating process, where attention biases are corrected between what was attended 
prior to making a choice, and an optimal distribution of attention. For example, if C is 
not well attended during the decision period, then a greater amount of attention may 
be allocated to that cue in feedback, compared to when C is well attended during the 
decision period.   
Currently, gaze fixation during feedback is not widely used or reported in 
studies of attention in learning. Future research should further test whether attention 
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during this time period is indeed reflective of prediction error. If this is the case, gaze 
fixation during feedback will provide a useful measure of updating processes in future 
work.  
The role of context learning  
The comparison of standard and balanced conditions in these experiments 
allows us to determine the influence of context associations on the inverse base-rate 
effect, and on attention to predictive cues. The difference in frequency of overlapping 
compounds in both groups means that the imperfect predictor (e.g. A in AB and AC) 
should be associated with the relevant common outcome within each compound pair. 
However, in the standard condition, one outcome is consistently paired with common 
compounds, such that the context is also more strongly associated with that outcome. 
In the balanced condition, each outcome is paired with both common and rare 
compounds, such that the context would be equally associated with both outcomes. 
Consistent with this idea, the EXIT model predicted greater attention to the context on 
common trials than on rare trials in the standard group, but not in the balanced group, 
which suggests a greater influence of context learning in the standard group. The 
Mackintosh model instead predicted that the context loses attention rapidly in both 
groups. 
The influence of context associations can provide a reasonable explanation for 
the differences in choice and pre-decision attention biases between groups. In the 
standard condition, participants can rely on the base-rate to help make accurate 
predictions on common AB trials. Although B is more predictive than A, it may be 
less necessary to focus on either cue in particular, relative to the balanced group in 
which the overall base-rate is not helpful. In the balanced group, the context does not 
provide a good prediction of either outcome, and therefore more attention would need 
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to be paid to the most predictive cues on every trial (cue B on common trials, and cue 
C on rare trials), in order to make an accurate response. Consistent with this idea, the 
common-bias to A was weaker in the balanced group, suggesting that they were 
paying less attention to this cue than in the standard group. Several authors have noted 
an association between the strength of common responses to imperfect cues and the 
strength of the inverse base-rate effect (e.g. Shanks, 1992; Kruschke et al., 2005), 
which has been taken as support for attention accounts. That is, the more A is 
associated with O1, the more attention should be shifted away from A to C on AC 
trials. Although we observed an equal pre-decision gaze bias to rare predictors on AC 
trials in both groups, increased attention to B on AB trials in the balanced group 
would result in a weaker association between A and the common outcome.6 As such, 
the reduced rare outcome bias on conflicting trials in the balanced group may well be 
a result of differences in attention due to context associations. That is, an equivalent 
predictive cue bias on AB and AC trials might result in cue C having less relative 
control over responding compared to cue B on BC trials.  
Again consistent with the predictions of EXIT, the pattern of post-feedback 
attention was no different between groups. Choice differences between groups 
therefore appear to be more strongly reflected in the pre-decision attention to cues, 
rather than error-driven attention shifts during feedback.  
Attention at test 
Our fixation time data from the test phase does not support either of the 
previous results regarding the strength of cue processing at test (Kruschke et al., 2005; 
O’Bryan et al., 2018). The absence of fixation time differences suggests that the effect 
                                                        
6 It is worth noting however that the inverse base-rate effect likely cannot be explained by appealing to 
context learning alone. In Experiment 3 of Don & Livesey (2017), AB-O1 and AC-O2 were trained in 
equal frequency, while pairings of high-frequency filler trials with O1 provided a strong overall base-
rate difference, and therefore strong context-O1 associations. These conditions were insufficient to 
produce the inverse base-rate effect on BC trials. 
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is not driven by continued overt attention biases to the rare predictor into the test 
phase. Rather, the contribution of attention to choice appears to be constrained to 
initial learning of the contingencies. Although researchers have emphasised the 
importance of attention biases at test for the inverse base-rate effect (e.g. Wills et al., 
2014; O’Bryan et al., 2018), the EXIT model does not necessarily require continued 
attention biases at test to predict an inverse base-rate effect. Indeed the predecessor to 
EXIT, the ADIT model (Kruschke, 1996), was able to predict the inverse base-rate 
effect in the absence of learned attention to cues simply by relying on rapid attention 
shifts driven by prediction error on a given trial but not retained across trials.  
Rule based-processes in the inverse base-rate effect 
 The purpose of this paper was to explore how well attention-based learning 
models can account for the inverse base-rate effect, and indeed it is clear that we have 
found changes in attention that are likely to contribute to choice biases. While we 
have focused primarily on attentional explanations of the inverse base-rate effect, the 
effect is not universally explained in these terms. There is a broad literature on the 
role of rules and reasoning in human learning (e.g., Mitchell, De Houwer & 
Lovibond, 2009), and the inverse base-rate effect specifically (Juslin, Wennerholm & 
Winman, 2001; Winman, Wennerholm, Juslin & Shanks, 2005). As we have 
previously discussed (Don & Livesey, 2017), non-attentional inferential processes 
may play a role in the choice of the rare outcome on conflicting trials, as well as 
differences in choice between standard and balanced groups. The most comprehensive 
inferential explanation for the inverse base-rate effect describes the rare bias as a 
consequence of eliminating the common outcome because of the noticeable 
dissimilarity between AB-O1 training trials and BC test trials (Juslin et al., 2001). 
There is now evidence from a range of studies that this eliminative inferential account 
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fails to capture many of the properties of the effect and makes corollary predictions 
that are demonstrably incorrect (see Don & Livesey, 2017 for a discussion). Although 
inferential hypotheses cannot provide a full account of the effect, we have found here 
that attention models are also limited in accounting for all eye-gaze and choice 
effects. There is good reason to assume that learned attentional biases are not fully 
controlled by deliberate inferential cognitive processes (e.g. Cobos, Vadillo, Luque & 
Le Pelley, 2018; Don & Livesey, 2015; Shone, Harris & Livesey, 2015), and applying 
associative learning algorithms to model attentional change remains a viable and 
justifiable approach, especially given the wealth of new empirical evidence 
supporting a link between associative learning and biases in visual attention (e.g., 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2018; Feldmann-Wüstefeld, Uengoer & Schubö, 2015; Livesey, 
Harris, & Harris, 2009; Luque, Vadillo, Gutiérrez-Cobo & Le Pelley, 2018).  
Nevertheless, by the same token, it seems likely that participants' choices at test are a 
result of a combination of processes including not only associative memory retrieval, 
but also inferential reasoning of some kind. There is certainly evidence of this in 
similar learning tasks that are designed to tease apart such influences when 
participants are faced with a novel test trial that requires generalization from trained 
instances (e.g. Don, Goldwater, Otto, & Livesey, 2016; Shanks & Darby, 1998; Wills, 
Graham, Koh, McLaren & Rolland, 2011). This may be the reason why both learning 
models do a less than impressive job of capturing the pattern of choice data in its 
entirety. 
Associability versus attention 
Attention is a notoriously vague term in psychology, and while it is 
consistently used in learning theoretic circles to refer to stimulus selectivity, there are 
many forms of stimulus selection to which it can be applied. The processes governing 
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each selection mechanism may not be the same. Classic attentional models of 
conditioning such as Mackintosh (1975) sought to characterise changes in stimulus 
associability specifically, that is the rate at which a cue enters into new learning, 
determined by how processing of that cue is prioritised over others. Mackintosh was 
explicitly agnostic about the possibility that these changes may also affect 
performance, for instance enhancing or diminishing the impact of previously learned 
associations on behaviour or indeed manifesting in overt attentive behaviours such as 
gaze fixation.  
 This is a key difference between Mackintosh's theory and Kruschke’s EXIT 
model, in which attention explicitly affects both associability and performance, and it 
gives us cause to be cautious about ruling out the Mackintosh model’s account 
entirely. Although several studies have found that predictive cues possess higher 
associability and attract longer dwell times than non-predictive cues (e.g. Le Pelley et 
al., 2011; Thorwart et al., 2017), beyond this correlation between two biases, it is not 
necessarily clear how associability is related to eye-gaze. While our eye-gaze results 
are clearly inconsistent with predictions derived from Mackintosh, it is possible that 
cue associability follows a different pattern, possibly one that is more consistent with 
Mackintosh than EXIT. It will be important for future research to determine whether 
cue associability changes in the same way as the eye-gaze measures reported here. 
For instance, in the tradition of the learned predictiveness effect, future research 
should test whether differences in the base-rates of the cue-outcome pairings affects 
the rate of future learning about those cues. 
Predictiveness principles 
The aim of this study was to compare and test the predictions of two attention-
based models of associative learning in the inverse base-rate effect when global 
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outcome frequency was manipulated between groups. Both EXIT and Mackintosh 
could predict a reduction in the rare choices for conflicting trials when global 
outcome frequency was matched in the balanced group. However, only EXIT could 
predict differences in attention to the context between groups. Although EXIT does 
not provide a perfect account of all the results presented here, on the whole, the 
results are far more consistent with EXIT than with Mackintosh. Across several 
conditions using eye-gaze measures at two critical time points within a trial, there was 
considerable evidence that attention to C over A is stronger than attention to B over A  
We therefore showed that two models derived from the same basic principle 
make opposite predictions about the relative attention paid to a rare predictor versus a 
common predictor of an outcome. The results demonstrate that the specific 
formalisation of these models is important, such that very different predictions can be 
derived based on how their learning algorithms operate.  
There is a small but growing list of attention-based learning phenomena that 
are not consistent with the traditional view of learned predictiveness, as it was 
originally characterised by Mackintosh (1975). For instance, under some 
circumstances, associability changes appear to be controlled by absolute 
predictiveness rather than relative predictivenesss (Kattner, 2015; Le Pelley et al., 
2010; Livesey et al., 2011). In other tasks, participants appear to invest more attention 
after they have encountered strong prediction error (Griffiths, Johnson & Mitchell, 
2011; Beesley et al., 2015). There are also questions remaining about whether 
predictiveness-driven changes operate exclusively on predictive cues or whether 
similar processes affect outcomes as well (see Griffiths and Thorwart, 2017; Thorwart 
et al., 2017; Quigley et al., 2018). Our data are also largely inconsistent with the 
traditional Mackintosh formalisation of the learned predictiveness principle, in that 
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they demonstrate that learning in the inverse base-rate effect generates stronger 
attention biases for rare predictive cues than for common predictive cues, and that the 
predictiveness of the context may be partly instrumental in generating this effect. 
There are, of course, several attention-based models that may be relevant for 
understanding attention biases in the inverse base-rate effect; for example, models 
that reconcile the influence of predictiveness and uncertainty on attention to cues (Le 
Pelley, 2004; Esber & Haselgrove, 2011). Future theoretical advances will require a 
variety of new test beds to determine the limits of attentional change as a consequence 
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Appendix 
Mackintosh Model 
The original version of the Mackintosh model includes a separable error term 
for each cue: 
 ∆VA =  𝑆α𝐴(λ − VA) (A1) 
where VA is the change in associative strength of cue A, and S and α are learning 
rate parameters. The error term, ( – VA), represents the discrepancy between the 
magnitude of the outcome on that trial () and the extent to which cue A predicts the 
outcome, or the individual associative strength of cue A (VA). A small error term 
indicates that the cue is a good predictor of the outcome, while a large error term 
indicates that the cue is a poorer predictor. Mackintosh (1975) allows stimulus 
specific α to change on each trial according to experience of a cue’s predictiveness, 
such that: 
 ∆αA > 0  𝑖𝑓 | λ − VA |  <   | λ − Vx | 
∆αA < 0  𝑖𝑓 | λ − VA |  ≥  | λ − Vx | 
(A2) 
where Vx is the associative strength of all other stimuli present on that trial.  If | – 
VA| is less than | – Vx|, αA will increase as cue A is a better predictor of the outcome 
than all other stimuli. If | – VA| is greater than or equal to | – Vx|, αA will decrease as 
cue A is an equal or poorer predictor of the outcome than the other stimuli present.  
A separable error term limits the ability of the model to account for several 
learning phenomena, such as conditioned inhibition.  Subsequent variations of 
Mackintosh (e.g. Le Pelley, 2004; Suret & McLaren, 2005; Pearce & Mackintosh, 
2010) instead use a summed error term, which can better capture cue competition or 
interactions between the predictions of cues (as in the case of conditioned inhibition). 
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It is possible that a version of Mackintosh with a summed error term may better 
account for the apparent discrepancy between attention and associative strength. We 
therefore used a modified version of the Mackintosh model, in which a summed error 
term is used for the associative strength connecting cue A to outcome k:   
 ∆VAk =  𝑆α𝐴(λ − ΣV) (A3) 
The following equation was used to implement Equation A2 computationally, after 
the associative strengths have been updated via Equation A3:  
 ∆αA =  θ(E̅  −  E𝐴 )  ×  αA(1 −  αA) (A4) 
where θ is a parameter that controls the rate of change of α, and E𝐴 represents the total 
prediction error of cue A summed across all outcomes k: 
 
E𝐴 = ∑ |λj − VAj|
𝑘
𝑗=1
  (A5) 
E̅ represents the total prediction error of each cue present on the current trial, summed 
across all outcomes k, then averaged across all cues C, which provides an estimate of 












Thus a strongly predictive cue should predict the presence of one outcome but also 
the absence of others. The term (E̅  −  E𝐴) reflects how predictive a given cue is 
relative to all cues present in a way that is analogous to Equation A2. If only two cues 
are present with no context or common element then (E̅  −  E𝐴) will be positive for 
one and negative for the other unless they are exactly equally predictive, but once 
context is also considered as an additional cue, this will not necessarily be the case. In 
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equation 4, αA(1 −  αA) ensures that α approaches asymptote (0 < α < 1), rather than 
becoming too large or becoming negative.  
A cue that strongly inhibits an outcome might end up with a large summed 
prediction error even when that outcome does not occur, because |λ − V| will be 
positive. Therefore all negative Vs are converted to 0 for the purpose of calculating 
each of the two error terms E̅ and E𝐴. To determine choice probabilities, we used the 
same derivative of the Luce (1959) choice rule used in EXIT to map associative 
strengths to response probabilities: 






The EXIT model has seven free parameters:  
1. Exemplar specificity: the specificity of the exemplar nodes (c in equation 3 in 
Kruschke (2001a); range: 0.01 – 20.0) 
2. Attention capacity: or the attention normalisation power (P in equation 5 in 
Kruschke (2001a); range: 0.1 – 20.0) 
3. Attention shift rate: A positive constant of proportionality (λg in equation 7 in 
Kruschke (2001a); range: 0.1 – 20.0) 
4. Choice decisiveness: a response probability scaling constant that converts 
output activation to response probability (ϕ in equation 2 in Kruschke (2001a); 
range: 0.1 – 20.0) 
5. Output weight learning rate: the associative weight learning rate (λw in 
equation 8 in Kruschke (2001a); range: 0.01 – 1.0)  
6. Gain weight learning rate: the learning rate for the associative weights from 
exemplar nodes to gain nodes (λx in equation 9 in Kruschke (2001a); range: 
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0.01 – 1.0)  
7. Bias salience: The salience of the bias (context) cue, (𝜎 in equations 3 and 4 in 
Kruschke (2001a); range: 0.01 – 2.0. All other cue saliences were fixed at 1.0) 
The parameter values were constrained to values between the upper and lower 
limits shown in brackets. To the best of our knowledge, Kruschke (2001a) did not 
include limits on the parameters in his model simulations. As such, where these 
parameters typically vary between 0 and 1, e.g. learning rate, these limits were 
imposed, and where they do not, an arbitrary limit of 20 was imposed.  
The implementation of Mackintosh used here has five free parameters: 
1. Learning rate: (S in Equation A3; range: 0.01 – 1.0) 
2. Initial alpha for cues: The initial associability of stimuli (range: 0.1 – 1.0). 
3. Initial alpha for context: The initial associability of the context (range: 0.1 – 
1.0). 
4. Theta:  A parameter that controls the rate of change of α (range: 0.1 – 1.0). 
5. Choice decisiveness:  A response probability scaling constant that converts 
output activation to response probability (ϕ in equation A7; range: 0.1 – 20.0). 
 
Parameter search 
Simulated annealing was used to find the best fitting parameters for each model 
(Kirkpatrick, Gelatt & Vecchi, 1983; Vanderbilt & Louie, 1984), which was run using 
the simulannealbnd function in the Global Optimisation Toolbox for Matlab. 
Simulated annealing is a preferred parameter estimation technique for complex 
models, as it allows upward movements on the error surface, which is useful for 
avoiding local minima (Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2011). That is, it allows the 
parameter search to jump out of local minima in order to better find the global 
minimum. Because the trial randomisation leads to differences in the model 
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predictions from one run to the next, each simulation was run with 30 simulated 
participants per group, and the parameter search was repeated five times. The set of 
parameters with the lowest root-mean-square error (RMSE; the average difference 
between the predicted and observed values) at the group level were selected.  The best 
fitting parameters for EXIT were: exemplar specificity = 15.26; attention capacity = 
14.78; choice decisiveness = 6.17; attention shift rate = 17.29; output weight learning 
rate = 0.37; gain weight learning rate = 0.09; bias salience = 0.02; RMSE = 5.81. The 
best fitting parameters for Mackintosh were: S = 0.32; initial alpha for cues = 0.14; 
initial alpha for context = 0.1; theta = 0.99; choice decisiveness = 8.88; RMSE = 5.72. 
These parameters were then used to estimate the model predictions for the test trials. 
This was again run five times, and the simulated data with the lowest RMSE are 
reported. 
 
 
 
